Ben is a City season ticket holder and author of the NCFC Analysis social media account, who unpicks Canaries’ games with an analytical report highlighting tactical strengths and weaknesses.
This is what Ben made of a bounce back Championship win after the Plymouth debacle.
Norwich v Birmingham: Control to the detriment of creativity?
Score: 2 – 0
Possession (%): 58 – 42
Passes: 601 – 432
Shots: 16 – 12
xG: 1.27 – 1.14
- Norwich’s central overloads.
- Birmingham’s early pressing adjustment.
- Norwich’s pressing triggers.
- A first-half overcorrection?
Base formations
After a dismal trip to Plymouth last weekend, David Wagner made just one change to his starting eleven, as Placheta replaced Hwang Ui-jo.
With the former naturally a left winger and the latter a striker, this change meant a new player would have to occupy the second striker role. That player was predominantly Rowe.
Birmingham boss John Eustace made three changes to the visitor’s lineup following their goalless draw last time out. Burke, Sunjic, and Longelo came into the Blues’ 4-2-3-1 base shape.
In their deep build-up, Norwich transitioned into their usual 4-2-4 midfield box shape. Typically, Rowe (27) and Idah (11) occupied the false nine positions, while Placheta (20) and Fassnacht (16) provided the width.
But in Norwich’s deep build-up structure, Rowe (27) and Placheta (20) occasionally switched roles, with the latter dropping alongside Idah (11).
Initially, the visitors pressed in an asymmetric 4-2-3-1 shape, with Miyoshi (11) lying just behind Hogan (9). Both players were occupying Norwich’s double pivot, while the wingers were ready to press the full-backs. Meanwhile, Sunjic (34) and Bielik (6) marked the double false nine, and the Blues’ full-backs tracked the host’s wingers.
But within thirty seconds of the game beginning, it was clear this structure was flawed. With Sunjic (34) marking Rowe (27), he was too far away to join the second line of pressure quickly. As a result, once Hogan (9) jumped to press Gibson, McLean temporarily became free.
To correct this weakness, the Blues soon made an adjustment to their press, as Sunjic (34) joined the second line of pressure and Sanderson (5) jumped onto the free false nine, who on this occasion was Placheta (20).
This created a 3-2-4-1 shape and ensured that once Hogan (9) pressed a centre-back, both Norwich pivots and false nines remained occupied.
With Sunjic (34) joining the second line of pressure earlier, Sanderson’s (5) role became crucial. The Birmingham centre-back was forced to jump into midfield to engage Norwich’s free false nine.
Therein lies the rationale behind Placheta (20) temporarily becoming a false nine. The City winger was able to exploit Sanderson’s (5) aggressive role by drawing him into midfield before outpacing him into the space he left behind.
This is a perfect example demonstrating that build-up play depends on the opponent’s press. If Sanderson (5) had failed to jump into midfield, the space would have been in front of the Blues’ back line rather than behind it.
For the most part, Birmingham failed to retain possession and were passive without the ball. As a result, Norwich were frequently able to progress into sustained periods of settled possession.
In these phases, Wagner’s Norwich often transition into a 3-diamond-3 shape as McLean (23) drops into a back three, the wingers invert, the full-backs overlap, and the second striker occupies the space between two inverting wingers.
On Saturday, this was no different, with Placheta (20) and Fassnacht (16) inverting while Rowe (27) occupied the space behind Idah (11).
In these periods, Birmingham dropped back and pressed from a 4-4-2 mid-to-low block. But despite dropping deep, the visitor’s press was somewhat chaotic and inconsistent at times.
Birmingham players often pressed without being backed up by teammates behind them. This, combined with Norwich’s settled play structure, gave the hosts numerous tactical advantages.
Behind the initial lines of pressure, Sunjic (34) and Bielik (6) were frequently overloaded in a central 3v2, with Idah (11) often pinning Drameh (12) to prevent the Birmingham right-back from jumping onto Placheta (20).
To prevent this overload, Burke (45) dropped alongside Placheta (20), while Sunjic (34) and Bielik (6) marked Rowe (27) and Fassnacht (16), respectively.
But another weakness opened up on the Blues’ left when Stansfield (28) joined Hogan (9) and Miyoshi (11) in the first line to apply pressure to Norwich’s back three; in doing so, he left Stacey (3) free as the Blues back line were slow to back up the press.
Additionally, the visitor’s midfield duo were inconsistent in their jumps; sometimes they would jump onto Norwich’s pivot, sometimes they stayed back. This inconsistency impeded each phase of the press, with players behind unsure whether they needed to jump into midfield.
For example, Sunjic (34) occasionally jumped onto Sara (17), leaving Placheta (20) and Rowe (27) in space between the lines, while Bielik (6) was isolated in a 2v1.
Despite creating these tactical advantages, however, Wagner’s men were frequently overly cautious in possession. The hosts would often break the initial line of Birmingham’s press, but they lacked the bravery to turn and play into the advantages they were creating. Ultimately, tactical advantages are futile if you fail to exploit them.
With Eustace’s side rarely playing out from goal kicks, the majority of the visitor’s possession came in settled play, where they created a 4-2-3-1 shape and Norwich moved into a 4-4-2 mid-block, with Rowe (27) joining Idah (11) in a front two.
Out of possession, Norwich’s strategy was clear. Passes out to the full-backs were the triggers for Norwich’s man-to-man press to begin.
When the visitors played out to Longelo (23), Idah jumped onto Long (26) while Fassnacht (16) pressed Longelo, Sara (28) tracked Bielik (6), and Stacey followed Stansfield (28).
The moment the Blues passed to Drameh (12), he was closed down by Placheta while Rowe (27) pressed Sanderson (5), McLean jumped onto Sunjic (34), and Giannoulis tracked Burke (45).
On this side, Miyoshi (11) often became the free man when McLean tracked Sunjic (34); the Japanese midfielder was a key outlet for the visitors, with Norwich occasionally too slow to close him down.
Norwich’s intense man-for-man press was designed to trap Birmingham against the touchlines, thereby forcing the visitors to play long. With the full-backs backing up the press effectively, Wagner’s men often won the loose balls played into the Norwich half.
On one of the few occasions the visitors played out from Ruddy, Norwich’s intense press proved to be significant in the second half. Exceptional backing up from Stacey forced a turnover high in the Blues’ half before Rowe found the bottom right corner of Ruddy’s net to make it 2-0.
In general, Saturday’s win was a positive response from Norwich. It was a performance characterised by control, albeit occasionally to the detriment of creativity.
This was especially true of the first half, where Norwich’s focus on maintaining control was, perhaps, an overcorrection following the chaos that ensued during defensive transitions against Plymouth.
Although Norwich were more rigid in their structure against Birmingham, the structure itself did not change significantly. Instead, they were simply more patient in possession and more effective in transitions.
But Wagner’s men cannot merely rely on ‘not making mistakes’ as the antidote for counterattacks. The structure should allow for creativity and bravery in possession while limiting their vulnerability in transitions – that is the point of a ‘rest defence’.
Ultimately, Wagner’s Norwich still need to find the balance between maintaining control and maximising their attacking output and creativity.
You can read all Ben’s previous analysis of Norwich City games via his social media accounts.
Web: NCFC Analysis
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